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OBSERVED DIFFERENCES IN CORRUPTION BETWEEN ASIA AND 
AFRICA: THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF CORRUPTION 
AND ITS CURE 
Antti Talvitie 
ABSTRACT 
The paper presents a nonconforming view about corruption and an approach to its 
‘cure’. It seeks to explain the anomalous situation that despite pervasive corruption and 
weak institutions, emerging economies in Asia attracted a flow of foreign investment 
and achieved a remarkable economic growth and reduction in poverty. Fragile coun-
tries in Africa have not done so well. 
The paper posits that the main difference in the corruption characteristics between the 
two regions is that in Asia corruption is part of the fixed cost and in Africa it is in the 
variable costs and consequently has less distortionary effect on investment and econom-
ic growth in Asia. Corruption becomes part of the fixed costs when it has a governance 
structure based on relationships. Although corruption and violent criminality are often 
correlated, many involved in corrupt governance structures are not evil. 
An early version of this paper was written and presented ten years ago under a slightly 
different title, and in that sense the paper is anachronistic. The paper has been updated 
and its concept that there are two kinds of corruption—variable and fixed cost corrup-
tion—remains valid. The qualification that needs to be made is that there has been pro-
gress in both continents and the broad-brush generalization applies to countries that 
are stuck in fragility in a different way from those that are making sustained efforts to 
bring stability and reforms in their country. So, with a decade-long arc and a slight 
change in the title of the early paper, the regions are good proxies for calling attention 
to the two kinds of corruption and their associated dysfunctions, crime, violence and 
political instability. 
The leaders are implicated as enablers of corruption. A further premise is that corrup-
tion is an emotional disorder and difficult to cure. The paper outlines modern group-
psychoanalytic process to governance and to reorient corruption based on the hypothe-
sis that the human drives, both positive and negative, that bring into being ‘good 
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enough’ government and a cohesive country are the same forces that act as agents of 
corruption and as a safeguard against it. 
Keywords - Corruption in Asia and Africa, Fixed and Variable Costs of Corruption, 
Neoinstitutional Economics and Corruption, Organization of Corruption, Psychoanaly-
sis and Corruption 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a nonconforming view about corruption and an approach to its 
‘cure’, which in the authors’ view is valid. The common definition of corruption is 
abuse of public power for private gains (World Bank 1997a)1. This definition leads to 
the assumption that its causes lie in the existence of monopoly rents whose distribution 
is under the control of authorities that have discretionary power and operate in a non-
transparent environment (Tullock 1967; and Rose-Ackerman 1997). Received theory 
and interpretation of empirical evidence have led to a hypothesis that high levels of cor-
ruption, weak institutions, and limited information disclosure discourage private sector 
investment and retard economic growth (Mauro 1997; North 1990; Tullock 1967; 
World Bank 1997a, World Bank 2011a). Because corruption is an obstacle to alleviat-
ing poverty, many have called for dislodging corrupt practices from economic activities. 
Successive World Bank Presidents, starting with Mr. Wolfensohn, have taken strong 
stands against corruption: It is wrong; it prevents or destroys social cohesion without 
which there can be no economic growth.2 
The East Asian ‘miracle’ took place within an inadequate institutional framework, sys-
temic corruption and crony capitalism. The region’s crisis in the late 90s exposed what 
had been known but not spoken: the East Asian political economy was rigged with cor-
ruption and rent-seeking. The chaebols, once thought of as the engines of South Korean 
‘miracle’, were culprits in economic ‘crimes’. In Thailand, politicians received bribes 
for government contracts, exemption from taxes, regulations, competition or transaction 
costs. In China, ordinary citizens had to use the ‘back door’ to get essential services.3 In 
Indonesia, the former president’s extended family and associates engaged in lucrative 
business deals, avoided transaction costs and competition, and received favorable gov-
ernment treatment. Businessmen paid bureaucrats to make decisions or police and gangs 
for protection. Several years later a new leadership has made much progress to uproot 
the most pervasive forms of endemic corruption (The Economist Special Report on In-
donesia Sept 12, 2009), although there continues to be pockets of resistance to govern-
ance reforms, including decentralization, carried out by President Yudhoyono. Recently, 
in India (the New York Times, unknown date; the Economist August 27, 2011) govern-
ment concessions to well-connected businesses caused Gandhi-like popular uprisings to 
force the government to enact Lokpal anti-corruption legislation with broad investiga-
tive powers. Despite widespread abuses of public power, these countries have attracted 
a large flow of foreign investment (figure A1 in the annex), register high levels of eco-
nomic growth, and have achieved a remarkable reduction in absolute poverty in the past 
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The effect of corruption on investment decisions is believed to be more detrimental in 
Africa than Asia. After accounting for other variables such as the availability of infra-
structure, regulations, and macroeconomic environment, a World Bank survey of the 
private sector, reported in the 1997 World Development Report (WDR), found that 
firms consider corruption more of an obstacle to doing business in Africa than in Asia.4 
Yet corruption in Asia is no less. 
The recent IEG evaluation of the World Bank’s Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) 
agenda (World Bank 2011a) is a comprehensive examination of governance and corrup-
tion issues, and shows that the “cancer of corruption” (Wolfensohn’s apt words) is a 
‘moving target’ and context specific. The GAC study also found that “the investment 
climate in a number of countries was constrained by public sector bottlenecks” (p. 96), 
which included customs, licensing and regulation, shadowy noncompetitive and market 
entry practices, and capture by politically influential persons, which consultative mech-
anisms only magnified. Earlier Kaufmann et al (2009) also concluded that “governance 
matters”. Strong links between corruption and governance, economic growth, poverty 
reduction and aid effectiveness in general have also been reported (e.g. Kaufmann and 
Kraay 2003). 
As a result of these findings, governance, institutional capacity development, sector 
restructuring, property rights, privatization, regulation, pricing reforms, and access to 
information all have significant bearing on the anticorruption agenda of aid entities. In 
many sectors risk assessment tools, specialized databases, or monitoring systems have 
been brought into use. Decentralization, community participation, engagement civil 
society organizations and increased transparency of decision-making have become inte-
gral parts of the reforms. 
Nonetheless, the recent literature on corruption has not presented new theoretical or 
effective approaches to deal with corruption. It continues to wring its hands over and 
quantify the large losses from corruption and its negative effects on poverty reduction 
(Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008; Kaufmann, 2005). The profession is also active in the de-
velopment of ‘red flags’ and elaborate surveys (Reinikka and Svensson, 2003) to meas-
ure, detect, prevent, inform and warn about corruptive practices (Kenny, 2006; Paterson 
and Chaudhuri, 2007) with intentions to pursue corrupt officials, persons and firms 
‘with zero tolerance’ and with more effective and coordinated sanctions (World Bank 
2011b) punish them. 
The World Bank’s GAC evaluation study (2011a) gives a multidimensional view of ‘the 
cancer of corruption’. Corruption is not simply ‘brown envelopes’ to enforce or reward 
compliance or cooperation, padded contracts for civil works, cash to ‘evil’ officials to 
gain contracts, or delivery of poor-quality products. Bank-focused, the IEG evaluation 
recommends several practical measures, tailored to the context, that are essential and 
relevant for both lenders and governments: improve governance (in dimensions men-
tioned above); foster public sector and civil service pay reforms; use country systems; 
support information disclosure with multiple media; give operational meaning to ‘zero 
tolerance’; strengthen lender-country dialogue to curtail elite or state capture and to em-
power citizenry; harmonize approaches to review and manage sector-level risks and not 
only transaction-level risks; and, for learning, improve monitoring of GAC responses. 
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The general tone conveys an emphasis on governance: for corruption to have significant 
negative effects it is not isolated, but endemic and part of the country’s leadership and 
governance ‘architecture’. 
To sum up, there is no shortage of studies and evidence of the deleterious effects of cor-
ruption on economic growth, poverty reduction and social well-being and of advice to 
‘combat’ it (World Bank 2009). But, here’s the quandary: how can we explain the fact 
that in the presence of pervasive corruption, sometimes abetted by an availability of a 
rich endowment of natural resources, a country makes significant economic progress in 
a short time? How do we explain the perceptions of investors about corruption in differ-
ent countries? An explanation in the 1997 WDR is that corruption in Asia is more pre-
dictable than corruption in Africa. If this is so, then why is it more predictable? 
This paper studies this question through a complex two-pronged hypothesis of why cor-
ruption in Asia had less adverse effect on investors’ long-term investment decisions and 
economic growth than in Africa, including its northern rim.5 
We first posit that the difference between the corruption characteristics and its effects 
on economic performance is that corruption, anchored on the leader(s), is part of the 
fixed cost in Asia and in the variable costs in Africa. Therefore, in Asia corruption has 
not affected investment decisions at the margin, while it has done so in Africa.6 We then 
argue, using the conceptual framework of Cheung (1982) that the recent changes in 
many Asian countries, slow as they may be, are because the costs of operating their cor-
rupted economy approached a level where the costs for operating a (relatively) uncor-
rupted economy plus the costs of changing the old system are less. The second prong of 
the argument is that corruption fundamentally derives from corrupt or violent leader(s), 
self-selected or elected, with pervasive long-term effects, and that this dysfunctional 
emotional basis of corruption makes it a much more complex problem than perceived in 
the extant literature. Finally, building on the notion that there is an emotional basis for 
corruption, we offer a proposal for a ‘talking cure’. But first, we briefly review the rele-
vant literature that covers the theoretical frameworks used in the analysis in this paper. 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 
The paper uses two theoretical frameworks: first, the New Institutional Economics and 
second (Modern) Psychoanalysis to analyze the problem of corruption and propose an 
approach to begin the work to resolve the dysfunctional basis of corruption. 
The analysis draws on several trends in the NIE framework as developed by Coase 
(1937, 1960), Cheung (1982, 1983), Williamson (1975, 1985), and North (1990, 2005); 
and the development economics of Hirschman (1967, 1970). The NIE framework ex-
tends the methods of neoclassical economics and holds that institutions matter and dif-
ferent types of economic activities call for different forms of institutional arrangements 
(Williamson, 1985). The NIE focus on private property rights, transaction costs, and 
institutions, and its microanalytic approach to the study of economic organization is a 
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useful instrument to identify the factors involved in choosing a particular form of gov-
ernance structure over other alternatives to organize economic exchange. 
The NIE gives a conceptual basis for analyzing corruption and governance structures. 
But this approach lacks a theory of human motivation and methods to develop a change 
process for treating corruption. Modern psychoanalysis is a more useful candidate for 
both. It is articulated in the theory and technique for individual and group psychoanaly-
sis developed by Freud (1917, 1921, 1933), Bion (1961), Ormont (2001), Spotnitz, 
(1952), Spotnitz and Meadow (1995), and Cohen et al (2002). 
For the NIE, Professor Coase, in The Nature of the Firm (1937), was the first to identify 
the transaction costs within an economic system, and to provide a rationale for the 
emergence of non-market institutions. He argued that “the main reason why it is profit-
able to establish a firm would seem that there is a [transaction] cost of using the price 
mechanism” (p. 38). Cheung (1982) extends Coase’s work on property rights and ap-
plies it to the analysis of institutional change. He classifies transaction costs into two 
categories: (1) those incurred in the operation of an institutional arrangement; and (2) 
those incurred in adopting or changing an institution. North (1990, p.27) gives a more 
precise definition of transaction costs as “the costs of measuring the valuable attributes 
of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing 
agreements.” Williamson (1985, p. 20–21) identifies ex ante and ex post transaction 
costs. The former includes the costs of negotiating and safeguarding an agreement. The 
latter includes the costs due to changed circumstances to correct ex post ‘misalignment’ 
to secure commitments. According to Williamson transaction costs become important 
when economic agents make relationship-specific investments. Without an array of 
safeguard mechanism, these can lead to opportunistic behavior by one of the agents. 
Bringing transactions into the firm limits opportunistic behavior; agent A is less likely 
to ‘hold up’ B if B is an employee of A than if B is an independent contractor. 
Because the corrupted contract relationship is full of hazards—corruption is illegal after 
all—formal rules and courts cannot be used to solve contractual ‘hold up’ disputes; 
business investments under a corrupt regime are riskier than under a non-corrupt re-
gime. In normal circumstances parties safeguard themselves by writing contracts ex ante 
that specify their obligations and attempt to spell out the adaptations to changing cir-
cumstances. However, the contracts will be incomplete and many adaptations have to be 
negotiated as the world evolves. If one of the parties to the contract had invested in 
highly specific assets, he is vulnerable to later opportunistic behavior by the other party. 
Therefore, an ex ante safeguard mechanism is necessary to support a vulnerable transac-
tions. And this is what relationships, the fixed costs of corruption, accomplish. 
The choice of relationship-building as an ex ante safeguard is a means to create trust 
and to avoid ‘hold-up’. Trust is an important factor in the disposition to corruption and 
in resistance against it. It operates both at individual and group levels and has a leader 
as its focal point. Freud (1921) conceptualized the role of the leader and the importance 
of identifications and emotional (libidinal) ties of members in ‘primary’ groups. Both 
the leader and the members’ emotional ties keep the group from dissolving.7 If the lead-
er is corrupt, veneration makes corruption ‘legal’ and emotional contagion, a concept 
formulated by Spotnitz (1976), spreads it in association with antisocial influences. Anti-
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social, destructive forces often fortify solidarity of a group. We will return to the im-
portant role of the group leader in Section 5. 
Because corruption is a choice, even when it is endemic in a culture, motivation is re-
quired to change this dysfunctional behavior. For plastic change, motivation for change 
must come from within. Members of privileged groups will resist, also unconsciously, 
efforts to reduce corruption. Members of marginalized groups, NGOs, and international 
organizations can militate to the other direction. Pressure and sanctions are necessary 
but not sufficient. The emotional and monetary costs of corruption need to be seen, 
known and felt. ‘Talking cure’, developed by Freud (Freud 1917) and extended to 
groups (Freud 1921, Spotnitz 1976, Bion 1961) is the method of choice for working 
with group disorders such as corruption.8 
Expanding the ‘talking cure’ technique to groups became an accepted practice long ago 
(Spotnitz 1952, Ormont 1995, Cohen et al 2002). Lear (1998) proposes that group anal-
ysis (‘polisanalysis’) started with Plato. ‘Polisanalysis’ also takes resistance and trans-
ferences in relation to the leader and within the group as its starting points, and study of 
emotional group relationships has an important role for the cohesion of a group or coun-
try; they, together with a new way of working with the Client, based on ‘contact func-
tion’, form the bases for remedial actions. These declarative propositions will be dis-
cussed and correlated with corruption in Section 5: The role of the leader and the 
change process, and in Section 6: State reform. 
THE FIXED AND VARIABLE COSTS OF CORRUPTION 
It was proposed earlier that fixed and variable costs of corruption are one facet that 
characterizes the corruption in the two regions. To understand why corruption in Asia is 
part of the fixed cost, the unit of analysis is corruption itself. And the focus is on how 
corruption is governed and organized instead of starting from speculations regarding its 
hedonic causes and consequences. This is not to suggest that the latter are unimportant, 
but there is an extensive literature on the presumed causes and consequences of corrup-
tion (see World Bank 1997a, 1997b, 2009, 2011a, and 2011b for annotated bibliog-
raphy). Value is added by focusing on understanding the organization of corruption. 
First the definition of corruption is modified: corruption is a contractual relationship 
between economic agents for the misuse of entrusted power or position. It is supposed 
that there are four agents in the economy: leader(s), private individuals, public officials 
and firms.9 The agents have contractual commitments to each other. The private interest 
pays a bribe to a public official to receive benefits or to avoid costs. If corruption is a 
nexus of contract between two or more independent agents, it entails transaction and 
other costs. The ex ante transaction costs include of determining who the actors are, the 
level and type of bribes and the rules and norms to consummate the transaction. The ex-
post costs include policing the agreement, ensuring compliance, adapting to changing 
circumstances, and resolving disputes. Deploying resources to observe the actors, meas-
uring the terms of the contract, and studying the ‘rules of the game’ to minimize the 
dangers all entail costs. 
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Simplifying, the variable costs of corruption occur on the spot, such as when one bribes 
a police officer to get away with a traffic violation. This contract is a spot market ex-
change normally without a governance structure and does not require a long-term rela-
tionship between the two agents. It only involves tacit knowledge that bribing is possi-
ble. The ‘fixed cost’ corruption is a contractual relationship between the private interest 
and government agent. Corruption in government contracts, ‘businesslike’ evasion of 
taxes, regulations or transaction costs, and elite or state capture are instances where the 
exchange of bribes and favors occurs over multiple periods. This type of corruption is 
open to contractual hazards from uncertainties and opportunistic behavior by contract-
ing parties due to its time span. The business investment will therefore be vulnerable 
above the normal economic risks and uncertainties. Suppose, for example, the private 
entity invests in project-specific assets in anticipation of a favor. This exposes it to op-
portunistic behavior by the government official. The official, after receiving the bribe, 
could renege on the contract or demand its renegotiation. He can do so because the in-
vestment has little value outside the project. In the jargon of the NIE, the public official 
‘holds-up’ the private entity. Contingencies in subsequent periods may require that the 
contractual relationship be renegotiated, leading one of the parties to try to extract more 
rent from the other. 
How do parties to a corruption contract then ensure compliance?10 In particular, how do 
they avoid a ‘hold-up?’ How, for example, does the private entity ensure that the gov-
ernment official will deliver after receiving the payment? Or, how does the government 
official know that the private party will deliver the money after he has made the ‘ex-
pected’ decision? Generally, how do the agents adapt to changing circumstances, espe-
cially if the new situation is such that one of the contracting parties has an incentive to 
‘hold-up’ the other? Answers to these questions are at the root of the difference between 
the two kinds of corruption and their implications on investment decisions. 
The Coasian insight suggests that when firms face ‘hold-up’ problems, they establish a 
governance structure (often a firm) to attenuate contractual hazards. According to Wil-
liamson (1985, p. 48), “transactions that are subject to ex post opportunism will benefit 
if appropriate safeguards can be devised ex ante. Rather than reply to opportunism in 
kind, the wise [contracting party] is one who seeks both to give and receive ‘credible 
commitment’.” Contractual hazards are attenuated when the costs of corruption are part 
of the fixed cost. The fixed investment allows both parties to minimize the ex ante and 
ex post transaction costs of a corruption contract. Both parties have a tacit understanding 
of the rules of the game, and their contract is self-enforcing. The fixed cost of corrup-
tion safeguards the contracting parties from the hazards of long-term contracts by ensur-
ing compliance and facilitating adaptation to changing circumstances. For many rea-
sons, including the asymmetry of information between the two agents, the danger of 
government entrapment, and the necessity for trust between the private and public 
agents to consummate corruption, the investment in ‘relationships’ is large and long 
term. 
From the business point of view, investing in a fixed cost of ‘corruption infrastructure’ 
becomes a risk management technique. This investment makes the expected return of 
business investment in a corrupt regime similar to that in a non-corrupt regime. The 
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existence of corruption does not affect business investment decisions at the margin. This 
is what plausibly happened in Asia. Businesses have incorporated the cost of corruption 
into their fixed costs. Without that investment to organize corrupt exchanges, businesses 
would remain outcasts who lack a tacit understanding of the rules of the game, and face 
corruption risks beyond the normal economic risks. 
The most important aspect of the fixed cost of corruption is the effort and cost deployed 
for ‘relationship building’.11 From the NIE perspective, businesses that face contractual 
hazards opt for vertical integration. That option is foreclosed: the private interest and 
government officials cannot merge. Instead they develop ‘relationships’ grounded in 
trust, reputation and understanding. The next best thing to vertical integration is to en-
sure that the government official is a trusted ally or a family member, who is less likely 
to hold up the private interest.12 This in part explains why many corrupt dealings in Asia 
involve family members or companies and political parties. 
A sophisticated way of developing a relationship is repeated interaction—periodic 
maintenance of the fixed investment—between a government official and private inter-
est. This encourages the two parties to cooperate to maximize their long-term benefits 
and refrain from short-term opportunism. This is akin to the repeated prisoners’ dilem-
ma, where parties decide to cooperate only after several iterations (Axlerod, 1983). In-
teractions between the parties involve emotional investments in a relationship, which 
foster trust and good reputation. They become an asset in the transaction, and it is to the 
advantage of each party to honor the contract. Not doing so could incur serious conse-
quences such as physical or emotional isolation, ostracism and even death. This emo-
tional basis of corruption supports the paper’s two-pronged hypothesis. 
Data, quantitative and qualitative, suggest that corruption in Asia is supported by a fixed 
capital to facilitate the exchange of bribes to minimize risks associated with opportunis-
tic behavior (legalized in Europe and the US as ‘lobbying’; organized as elite/state cap-
ture in the former FSU and the Eastern European countries). Once this fixed cost is in-
curred, firms can do business as usual with little risk for the ‘hold-up’. In contrast, busi-
nesses shy away from Africa because corruption does not allow appropriating their in-
vestment. The contractual relationship for corruption in Africa is full of hazards and 
vulnerable to ‘hold-up’ or at least ‘social responsibility’. This is because the private 
interests and government agents, due to perceived government instability or violence, 
have not been in a position to invest in a ‘relationship’ and establish a governance struc-
ture for corruption.13 Businesses must pay bribes to obtain government favors and this 
opens them to opportunistic ‘hold up’. Like the physical infrastructure, the corruption 
infrastructure is also deficient in Africa. 
A stable government and informal institutions —including common informal rules, 
norms, lobbying and customs of society ––facilitate relationship building and reputation 
(North, 1990). Asia’s informal institutions have been important in the development of 
the economy by providing trust and norms for business exchange (Fukuyama, 1995). 
They are grounded in Asia’s cultural history, which values personal relationships, trust 
and honor. Often, contractual disputes are solved informally, and the court system is 
avoided as much as possible. The same cultural setting may also facilitate corruption by 
promoting firms to invest in dysfunctional relations with government officials to con-
Antti Talvitie 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 13, Iss. 1, 2012 
 www.ipmr.net  120 IPMR
summate corrupt transaction. Paradoxically, a stable government is essential for busi-
nesses to invest in a relationship, but, culturally, at least in Asia, informal relationships, 
formally outside the government, are equally important for business. 
A reason then why corruption remains a variable cost in the African continent is the 
perceived instability (and in some cases short life span) of governments, violence, and 
lack of democracy. This leads, intentionally perhaps, to an unstable bureaucracy and 
unprofessional civil service and discourages businesses from investing in ‘relation-
ships’. On the other hand, bureaucracies in Asia have been stable and integrated with 
‘politics’ (World Bank 1993).14 In Africa, violent leaders have acted as the sole sover-
eign guarantee and extracted the bribe income. Absent the fixed investment to organize 
the exchange of corruption, businesses face high corruption risks and the expected re-
turn of business investment is lower. When the productive life of an investment in a 
relationship with the government is short, even less than the perceived life span of the 
government, the private sector is reluctant to make sustained, long term investments 
whose returns accrue over a long period. That requires the cooperation of successive 
governments and is affected by the presence of corruption. This doesn’t prevail in Afri-
ca but does in Asia. 
It is concluded that a different interpretation of the 1997 WDR survey results would be 
that businesses find it difficult to integrate corruption in Africa as ‘business as usual’ 
because of the deficient corruption infrastructure and lack of a stable relationship and 
focal point to pay bribes and receive favors. In the short run, the bribe as a variable cost, 
without supporting fixed capital, affects business decisions more than ‘organized’ cor-
ruption. The 2011 GAC evaluation, which emphasizes the importance of governance, 
information disclosure and method of engagement (and working with the client), sup-
ports the arguments of this paper; the only thing missing is the importance of leaders. 
Corruption and Rule of Law 
Before discussing why a change from the prevalence of corruption appears inevitable in 
much of Asia, and which has already happened to a degree, it is important to point out 
an aspect of corruption and the rule of law. It is common knowledge that corruption 
erodes the rule of law. Laws enacted to govern economic activities are routinely violat-
ed in a corrupt regime. 
The extent of the erosion of rule of law is affected by whether corruption is part of the 
fixed or variable cost of doing business. Using the same analysis as above, variable-cost 
corruption erodes the rule of law more than fixed-cost corruption in the following sense. 
Suppose the government enacts a rule on truck axle loads to limit road damage. Weigh 
stations and fines are established to enforce the rule, but truckers could pay a bribe to 
avoid it. If a trucker has to pay a bribe at the weigh station, then it is part of his variable 
cost of transporting the goods and his truck load will vary with the bribe. For example, a 
trucker was hauling goods that weigh “W” and cost “T” with net revenue “R” before the 
new rule; but, with the new rule he has to pay a bribe b to the official to transport “W” 
so that the cost of hauling is now “T+b”. For the trucker to stay revenue-neutral, he 
increases the truck load by weight x to cover the bribe. In a competitive environment the 
trucker is a price-taker and the revenue-neutral weight will be a higher “W+x”. Because 
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corruption is part of the variable cost of hauling the goods it results in a violation of the 
law and in damage to the roads. 
On the other hand, if a trucker – or the owner of a fleet -- also invests in a relationship 
with officials when making capital investments that provide for the ‘permit’ that lets 
any truck go through at the weigh station, the cost would be part of the fixed cost of the 
truck. The cost of corruption is not part of the variable cost of hauling the goods. In-
stead it is incurred when decisions to buy a truck is made. The truck loads being trans-
ported do not vary, but will remain at “W”. This may be higher than what the new law 
is trying to achieve, but smaller than the “W+x” that was obtained when the trucker’s 
bribe was part of the variable cost.15 
In sum, then, observations support the view that corruption in Asia is part of the fixed 
cost, while in Africa it is part of the variable cost. As a result it does not affect business 
investment decisions at the margin in Asia. But, in Africa, where corruption is a varia-
ble cost, investment decisions at the margin are affected and, additionally, the rule of 
law is violated more. 
WHY THE CHANGE? 
Since ‘fixed cost’ corruption is associated with rapid economic growth and reduction in 
poverty in Asia, it begs the question why change away from corrupted governance is 
inevitable. Indeed, irreversible change would be occurring regardless of whether or not 
there was the financial collapse of the 1990s. That was an endogenous event that merely 
speeded things up. The outcomes of this process, while clear, are by no means support-
ed by self-evident causal reasoning. In this section the NIE method of Steven Cheung is 
used to outline the broad political economy reasons for change. 
It has been argued that the Asian crisis in the 90s and its impact was due to the econom-
ic policies pursued by countries and international lenders, not corruption, and that the 
financial collapse and the successful challenge to political leadership were results and 
not causes.16 That argument does not ring true. The country’s leaders had pursued bad 
and corrupt policies for an extended period of time; they triggered corrupt behavior 
from international private lenders and the multilateral banks. This was an experiential 
perception of citizens and investors alike, especially about Indonesian society and its 
functioning. Not so latent discontent was widespread (as presently in the Arab and some 
other countries). Two prime factors caused the change in government. The first was 
simply that corruption became too expensive. The second equally dramatic factor, espe-
cially in Indonesia: the illness and dissolution of emotional ties to the leader. Later, the 
lack of positive emotional ties to the leader was manifested among the citizens in East-
Timor and Aceh (and other Asian countries). The violence that erupted confirms the 
partial disappearance of emotional ties also among the members of a leaderless group. 
These two causes are elaborated further next.  
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Cheung (1982) proposes that institutional change occurs when: 
Cost of Operating the Current Institutions > Costs of (Adopting or Changing to a 
New Arrangement + Operating the New Institutions) 
I follow Cheung in classifying and assessing cost changes in both sides of the equation. 
Costs of Operating the Current Institutions 
Although similar mechanisms are in effect in other countries, Indonesia up to the 
mid/late 90s is the specific reference where the costs of corruption were very large. The 
bribes paid to the bureaucracy ––the bureaucrats were paid poorly in both ‘dry’ and 
‘wet’ positions––are a minor part of the costs. The real costs were elsewhere and de-
rived from the lack of property rights. Corruption restricted the range of options for 
production and for institutions, and led to increased costs, thus choking off the true po-
tential of the economy (Cheung 1983; Rose-Ackerman 1997).17 Corruption restricted 
entrepreneurs’ choices at least in three ways. First, it disregarded respect for private 
property rights, which the lack of fair courts compounded. Second, through the bureau-
cracy, privileged groups set government constraints to benefit only themselves or de-
layed decisions for competing entrepreneurs, which in turn reduced the income-
generation potential of the entrepreneurs’ private property. Third, for a bribe, bureau-
cracies gave licenses, granted exclusive property rights, or built facilities for privileged 
groups’ businesses. Or, privileged groups decided to buy private property against the 
owner’s will, possibly offering him a minority stake in the enterprise. Or, they side-
stepped regulations or avoided transaction costs that other groups could not. Examples 
could be cited to show of how private property rights were not respected and choices 
constrained in Indonesia, resulting in increased costs to the economy. The bureaucrats 
were either compensated with ‘wet’ positions for cooperation or isolated to ‘dry’ ones 
for the lack of it. Ongoing decentralization further increased the fixed costs of corrup-
tion because ever larger number of individuals was brought into the dysfunctional rela-
tionships and away from the productive ones. It is concluded that the costs of operating 
the current corrupt economic arrangement were increasing rapidly.18 
Costs of Changing Institutions: Resistance by Privileged Groups 
A significant cost component in the equation is wrapped inside the resistance by privi-
leged groups.19 This resistance must be lowered gradually for nonviolent change to oc-
cur. As part of World Bank evaluation work the author visited Indonesia in late 90s just 
before and during the first week of the collapse of the Indonesian rupiah and inter-
viewed more than 50 persons in government, the private sector, trade associations, and 
NGOs to discuss and evaluate the World Bank supported infrastructure projects. To the 
author’s surprise, there was great openness about corruption; the same candor was evi-
dent in the local press and in talks with ordinary people. No one liked corruption but 
was ashamed of it. Interviewees expressed a desire to have something done about it and 
a willingness to cooperate. 
Observed Differences in Corruption between Asia and Africa: The Industrial Organization of Corruption and Its Cure 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 13, Iss. 1, 2012 
 www.ipmr.net  123 IPMR
But there was also genuine resistance to change. The increase in economic well-being of 
many ordinary citizens over the past 30 years would be ruined, they believed, and this 
was one source of resistance. The low-salaried officials resisted changes because the 
absence of corruption income would put them below survival levels. There was uncer-
tainty about how the uncorrupt institutions would operate. This was healthy resistance. 
Undoubtedly, the strongest resistance came from the organized coalition: the privileged 
groups. This resistance was fortified by their potential for violence: privileged groups 
controlled both the army and the police, and they had been willing to use violence to put 
down rioting. The unprivileged were also potentially violent; they had little to lose.20 
Resistance by privileged groups can be examined from many angles. As already noted, 
especially critical is the role of the leader(s). Members of a group or country identify 
with their leader; if he is corrupt, emotional contagion spreads it, often in association 
with antisocial and harmful influences. This has two practical implications. Because 
money is a ‘normal’ good—more is preferred to less—simply and only increasing offi-
cials’ salaries is unlikely to have much effect on corruption. The leader(s)’ corruption is 
an invitation to the officials to be corrupt. Their low salaries justify accepting bribes and 
make the leader(s)’ corruption palatable. By an ingenious policy, the leader’s dysfunc-
tion legitimizes officials’ acquiescence and absolves them from guilt. Second, success-
ful resistance to this emotional contagion isolates the resister (official) and there is little 
chance that isolated resister(s) can help institute anti-corruption policies. In the circum-
stances described, and when the economy was growing and poverty declining, there was 
little hope that the resistance of privileged groups would decline in favor of desirable 
social change. Culture also is a factor in resistance. In Asia, respect for authority is high, 
and one’s honor and socially syntonic behavior are highly valued; disobedience and 
even differences in opinion are punishable. Thus, despite the emotional guilt that ac-
companies corruption, the leader is protected for fear of reprisals. And the leader in turn 
gives the officials relief from self-reprimand, for he, too, is corrupt. 
Indonesia’s well-being was gone with Suharto’s fall and released bent-up violence and 
anger. Perceptions and realities of the people changed quickly; acquired wealth disap-
peared almost overnight. There was no one to honor the corrupted contracts or to com-
pensate for the losses. Even before the governance and economic collapse, two-three 
weeks prior, no one we spoke with in Indonesia liked the status quo, suggesting that 
pressure from inside was increasing; in fact it was almost tangible and the resistance of 
the privileged groups was crushed. 
Reducing the costs of operating a non-corrupt regime: the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
An important element in reducing the costs in the right hand side of the equation, nearly 
always ignored but no less important, is the inclusion of the bribe givers in the change 
process. When corruption is viewed as a contract between two independent agents both 
agents must be included in the process. In this way the costs of operating a non-corrupt 
regime can be reduced. It is a surprise that until recently policy and academic discus-
sions neglected the role of the private sector and the bribe giver when designing reme-
dies for corruption. Businesses prefer not to pay bribes, because bribes are an added cost 
to them. But, individually they pay bribes to receive contracts or avoid costs because if 
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one businessman does not pay bribes the other will. Hence, there is a prisoner’s dilem-
ma situation where the dominant strategy of each individual businessman is to pay 
bribes. The outcome is suboptimal where every one pays bribes with no one willing to 
get out alone. 
Therefore, policies to fight corruption need to approach also the private sector to help 
resolve the prisoners’ dilemma. The private sector’s trade associations can lobby for 
better ways to ‘combat’ corruption.21 The OECD measure to make it illegal for member 
countries to engage in corruption and the recent collective debarment policy of the mul-
tilateral banks will reduce the collective action dilemma (Hines 1995). Uncertainty 
about the future and the operation of new institutional arrangements can be reduced by 
giving the beneficiaries a greater voice in decision-making and thus reinforce the posi-
tive aspects of relationships. Technical assistance programs and the seemingly mundane 
issues of concern and of greatest difficulty in aid sponsored projects— construction 
quality, the political economy of infrastructure maintenance, procurement, and adminis-
trative decentralization—can be structured to increase local participation. These ap-
proaches frustrate the privileged groups by making corruption more costly. Privileged 
and non-privileged groups are helped change their behavior in response to pressure from 
within when they are partners in change. The problem is how this change process 
should be structured. To this problem we turn next. 
THE ROLE OF THE LEADER AND THE CHANGE PROCESS 
It has thus far been argued that corruption contracts are self-enforced by long-term rela-
tionships and reputations developed between businesses and government officials. In all 
cases a third party––the leader––is the arbitrator and often silent enforcer of the corrup-
tion contract and the sophisticated businesses will seek a high level relationship with the 
leader or his close associates to enlist them as a ‘sovereign guarantee’. Events in Asia 
and elsewhere have shown that the leaders––and not (ideals such as) democracy and 
rule of law––are the sovereign guarantee. 
The onset of the financial and social crisis, in Thailand, was one to two years before 
contagion began spreading in the fall of 1997. Some international Banks had discontin-
ued their support for large ongoing projects, and withdrawn commitments from other 
projects, over concerns of the Thai government not honoring contracts. Concurrently, 
the political leadership problems continued with accusations of corruption and the baht 
exchange rate was fixed artificially high. All this was widely reported in the Bangkok 
press. The crisis in Indonesia was preceded by persistent rumors that President Suharto 
had fallen ill. A comparable pattern of challenge to leadership occurred in Korea and 
Malaysia (later in Georgia and in many Arab countries). Businessmen fearing that their 
contracts were no longer protected began pulling out their investments first from Thai-
land, then from Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia and made the ‘disease’ worse. What 
made the contagion a ‘disease’ was the insecurity and slackening of emotional ties with 
corrupt leadership, democratic or undemocratic. Fidelity toward same (different) reli-
gious ideas lessened (compounded) the consequences. 
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Although similar motivational mechanisms are at work in Asia, Africa, and other conti-
nents and countries, pointing toward communality in treatment regimes, the emotional 
ties with the leader and his inner circle influence corruption and its governance structure 
and costs. When the dominant emotional ties are positive, libidinal, corruption is ar-
ranged to be part of the fixed cost and enjoy permanence of object. When the dominant 
emotional ties are negative, hateful, and the group is held together by the force of vio-
lence, the corruption is primarily in the variable costs. Negative feelings can become 
powerful enough to change the object and depose the leader.22 
The removal of corruption in a libidinal group would involve transforming a complex 
web of relationships developed over a long period. A large number of beneficiaries and 
privileged groups will resist change on the strength of the emotional ties, also affecting 
the non-privileged groups. Consequently, violence is an ever-present threat unless man-
aged with skill. If corruption is in the variable cost and the group is held together by 
force, the problem consists of encouraging indigenous culture, positive relationships, 
and emotional ties among the involved groups (Rich 1996). Only after that the focus 
may sift to corruption and the dysfunctions of the institutions. 
These are distinctly different prescriptions from the current theories and techniques 
which in straightforward fashion argue for ‘zero tolerance’ combined with a changed 
regulatory framework and policies, and their enforcement—like changing a car engine. 
Thus, an increase in civil service pay, removing government restrictions, price controls, 
subsidies and tax privileges, and similar government policies would reduce corruption.23 
However, these proposals make the problems to be the solutions. If the change of gov-
ernment policies is compelled by outside forces––such as IMF, World Bank or G7––the 
problems will return in disguises. If the ‘costs’ of changing government are low, or if 
government officials change frequently, there is no guarantee that the change would be 
for the better. Governments that are perceived to be unstable or easily toppled are not 
able to negotiate and enforce uncorrupted regulations. Paradoxically, both a high level 
of government stability or capacity for uncontested violence is also associated with no 
corruption or with systemic corruption. 
If persons and groups who design the collective rules are not corrupt, or if they are cor-
rupt but desire a change, then the governmental constraints can be changed. That may 
not be easy. In what follows we discuss how changes could come about in a society 
where corruption is dominantly libidinal. The discussion is appropriate, but not suffi-
cient, also for societies where corruption is dominantly secured by a violent leader and 
his ‘lieutenants’ or gangs. 
STATE REFORM24 
According to philosopher and psychoanalyst Jonathan Lear, a significant insight from 
the last century’s famous philosophers, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and von Wright, was 
that people live by their concepts. A central issue, though not the only one, in improving 
governance (and to getting rid of corruption in the process) is to help people change the 
concepts by which they live and work. 
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What constitutes ‘cure’ for a corrupt state? How could institutions strengthened and 
individual functioning change to improve governance? Freud’s metaphor of the chess 
game (for the ‘talking cure’) is relevant here: only the opening moves and the end-game 
can be described and taught. We proceed backwards and describe first the end-game, 
the broad outlines of the ‘cure’, and then the opening moves in the reform. 
Without reviewing here the vast literature on institutional design we accept McDou-
gall’s proposition (1920) for well-functioning organizations, be they ministries, admin-
istrations, private entities or civil society organizations. They fit well with Freud’s mod-
el for the organized group, as he himself writes (Freud 1923, pp. 14-19), and with our 
arguments in this paper. 
McDougall proposes five (multidimensional) conditions that are fundamental to the 
healthy functioning of a group. They are (as described in Freud 1923, p.86): 
1. There should be a degree of continuity in the group, either material or formal: 
material if the membership of the group is persistent; and formal, if there is 
within the group a system of fixed positions which are occupied by a succes-
sion of individuals. 
2. The individual member of the group should have or form a definite idea of the 
nature, composition, functions and capacities of the group so that he may de-
velop an emotional relationship to the group. 
3. The group should be brought into interaction (perhaps in the form of rivalry) 
with other groups similar to it but differing from it in many respects. 
4. The group should possess traditions, customs and habits, especially those that 
determine the relations of its members to each other. 
5. The group should have a definite structure, expressed in specialization and dif-
ferentiation of the functions of its constituents. 
A sixth prescription for government entities should be added: 
‘The organization should have transparent decision processes; requirements, in-
cluding, to a degree, the Rawlsian prescriptions for equality, liberty and justice; 
public inquiries about progress and results of work; and an appeal process for 
plans and plan implementation’. For State as the group, the principles of inclu-
sion, equal opportunity and fairness need to be added (although they could fall 
under the “traditions, customs and habits .. that determine the relations of mem-
bers to each other”). (Talvitie 2012). 
Freud notes (1923, p. 86) that “according to McDougall ... the collective lowering of 
intellectual ability is avoided by withdrawing the performance of intellectual tasks from 
the group and reserving them to the individual members of it.” McDougall’s group con-
ditions need to be put in modern context. 
Freud also shrewdly observed that the problem of a group, and in our case also the prob-
lem of organizational design, consists “in how to procure for the group [organization] 
precisely those features which were characteristics of the individual [that is], his own 
continuity, his self-consciousness, his traditions and customs, his own particular func-
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tions and position” (p.86), and, I would add, his independent but co-operative perfor-
mance in the team’s work tasks. 
The change process environment 
The proposal to improve governance rests on three pillars: the contact function; re-
sistance to change; and transferences within the group participants. These are discussed 
in turn shortly. The setting is a regularly occurring group meeting (say once or twice a 
month) for a minimum of twenty sessions lasting about two hours about improvement 
of governance in the country. The participants, charged with ‘re-engineering’ of the 
concepts by which the country leadership lives, may be asked to read an assigned paper 
before the meeting. In the meetings the participants are asked to talk, and every one 
must talk. No particular topic or focus is prescribed although it is likely that work issues 
related to the paper are brought up. Periodic seminars may also be arranged where per-
sons in leadership positions in the country or entity, suspected bribe takers or givers 
who engage in legal activities, foreign and local consultants and industrialists active in 
the country, and leaders in civil society organizations, are asked to make presentations. 
The analyst/facilitator team should consist of three persons, one of whom is a silent ob-
server of the process and the note-taker. All team members should have training in 
group analysis, and a good understanding of government processes and methods to 
study dysfunctional behavior.25 If technical assistance consultants are active in the coun-
try, they also may attend as silent observers.26 
Contact functioning 
The term and method of contact function was developed by Hyman Spotnitz (1976) to 
work with analysands and groups. Contact function simply means that the analyst team 
remains in tune with the analysands’ (group’s) verbalizations without disturbing them or 
introducing new ideas or interpretations. Therefore, discussions in the group meetings 
are not restricted to or focused on governance or corruption. The ‘talking cure’ proceeds 
in small steps toward a moving goal without a comprehensive reform plan. That plan 
and its implementation is the responsibility of the participants in their own work envi-
ronment, not of the analyst team during the group sessions. 
The group is directed to examine the issues, whatever they are, and the analyst team 
should analyze them silently, and break silence only to resolve a resistance or to protect 
a member. The objective is not to prescribe desirable behavior patterns but to remain 
ego-syntonic and solicit views. There is no need to rush the group to study corruption. 
Appropriate questions must fit the context of the dialogue, like in a chess game, rather 
than be structured in advance. “How could governance be improved?”; ”Who should to 
lead the work?”; “What kinds of effects would these improvements have?”; “Why are 
these things not done?”; “Is there corruption and how does it work in this place?”; 
“Who benefits from it?” “Why do people participate in corruption?” “Why do private 
firms engage in corruption?” “How do they do it?” “How can it be prevented?” The 
responses to questions would be personal (concepts) rather than objective ‘truths’, and 
may raise new issues for examination. In time, ‘realism’ will gain the upper hand and 
the participants will take action on their own volition. The danger of failure is not with 
Antti Talvitie 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 13, Iss. 1, 2012 
 www.ipmr.net  128 IPMR
delays to act, but with the analyst team’s desire to ‘speed things up’ or require upfront 
commitments. The responsibility for taking action must rest with the client, and this 
may take time. 
Resistance to change 
Anyone who has worked in a corrupt country also knows that it is camouflaged by re-
sistance to change. Many of these countries have signed the UN covenant against cor-
ruption. The service providers may also have signed similar pledges. Both sides, and 
also the public, know about the ‘fixed cost corruption’, but its workings are concealed 
and reflect the political economy of the country. If this well-oiled system is not faced up 
to it will continue until the collapse of its governance structure, often violently, or the 
country’s financial sector can no longer support it. 
There are at least two (unconsciously motivated) disorderly paths for discharging re-
sistance to change. Both are of serious concern and require that their removal be gradual 
to prevent violence. The first, normally accompanying economic hardships, is when a 
majority pits itself against a minority, ethnic, political or religious. Anger is vented 
against minority groups, while sparing the privileged groups with whose (rich) members 
and leaders they (like to) identify. The second is the dissolution of emotional ties to the 
leader or among the people, or the fall of a violent leader, both resulting in violence and 
disorder.27 
Current approaches to ‘combating corruption’ are intellectual, cognitive and tilted to-
ward punishment. Others, the ‘positive’ ones, consist of training and technical assis-
tance to learn rules and processes that would prevent corruption or of lectures of the 
detrimental effects of corruption. Paradoxically, they may simply teach new ways to 
avoid detection of corrupt practices. 
Without forums where all things that participants bring up can be discussed and ex-
plored (without judgment or fear) over a sustained period, unraveling the web of corrupt 
relationships is impossible. That is a demanding requirement. But, interestingly, rela-
tionships, though dysfunctional in corruption, do have positive attributes that will foster 
cooperation and rearrangement of personal and institutional functioning—provided 
there is motivation and a trustworthy leader to improve governance (as emerged in the 
first decade of 2000 in Indonesia). 
An important part of dealing with resistance is the development of trust. Trust is neces-
sary in order for the members of the group to feel confident enough to escape from the 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’, that is, where no 'player' –say a Minister, General Manager of an 
entity, the Chief of Police, a Director, or any person rewarded for cooperation— can 
make a move unilaterally because he owes his position to the leader or the leader’s inner 
circle. To break the trust of that group would lead to isolation, severe punishment and 
even death. Therefore, protection from harm must be provided. Gradual loosening of the 
resistances in itself is protection; changes that take place slowly and in many places 
make them observable only after passage of time, a decade or more. Nonetheless, escap-
ing from the prisoner’s dilemma is an important milestone because it signifies an ability 
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to think and act independently—as McDougall postulated—a movement toward a well-
functioning group and, therefore, requires protection from reprisals. 
Transferences among the participants and the analysts/facilitators 
In the regular (say monthly) face-to-face meetings (using a videoconference facility if 
necessary part of the time) with the analyst team, emotional transferences develop 
among the participants.28 The ramifications of concepts, ideas, related behavior, all as-
pects of governance and corruption are discussed and examined without judgment. Pat-
terns in other countries are studied if so desired. Solutions are explored and studied, but 
as a group no actions are promoted or taken. 
Handling of multiple transferences in groups is difficult. It is very easy for the analyst 
team to see the group work as an objective brain-storming event. Much more difficult is 
being able detect a team member‘s verbalizations as reflections of his behavior patterns 
at work, home or social settings, which were learned long ago and were now being pro-
jected onto the analyst (team) or a member of the group. An added difficulty is the ana-
lyst team’s counter-transference reactions, which often take the form of recalling and 
presenting a similar problem in his native country and how it was solved, rather than 
remaining in the room and analyzing the meaning of the views being presented as being 
‘personal truths’, fantasies and concepts by which the particular person lives.29 
Although there is much experience of how to work productively with therapy groups 
which have stable membership, very little experience exists on how to work with transi-
ent groups where members may change as bureaucracies or organizations evolve. None-
theless, experiences with therapy groups, in conflict resolution, mediation and public 
inquiries, as reported in the references, strongly suggest that the proposal has merits for 
experiential learning. 
Corollary 
The proposals put forward in this paper have several practical implications. Two de-
serve a mention. The first concerns the practice, in the multilateral development banks, 
of staff rotation to move to another country or region normally after five years. This is 
counterproductive. The reason for rotation supposedly is ‘cross-fertilization’ and to pre-
vent identification with and capture by the client. But, governance renewal takes many 
years, and it takes years to learn the sociopolitical economy of the country. It would 
help matters if the same team worked in the country as long as there is mutual interest in 
doing so. The development bank staff—directors, managers, team members—need to be 
trained not to be captured or co-opted and learn to limit socialization with the clients, 
but remain a transference figure capable for self-analysis of counter-transference feel-
ings, and so help the clients become good professionals. 
The second implication is the residence and language skills of the analyst (task) teams. 
Clearly, residence in the region is highly advantageous with some team members actual-
ly residing in the country. If well-trained, it does not matter if they are citizens or not. It 
is desirable that task team members learn to speak the language of the country. This is 
possible with long term commitment and would greatly simplify communication and 
effectiveness of the work. 
Antti Talvitie 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 13, Iss. 1, 2012 
 www.ipmr.net  130 IPMR
CONCLUSIONS 
The author believes that, as a broad-brush generalization and without violence to facts, 
governance is homogeneous within the two (proxy) regions but not between, and that 
working in the interface of the two theories employed in the paper, intermediated by 
leadership, has its benefits: a fresh approach to treat corruption. The paper should not be 
misread as a broad-brush generalization of Africa as one country. There has been pro-
gress in the last decade in Africa; many countries, starting from a low base, are experi-
encing (inequitable) economic growth, but many are not. Thus, to be precise a qualifica-
tion is added: "fragile countries in Africa" rather than simply Africa; and, “the emerging 
economies” in Asia rather than simply Asia. Our concern is with countries that are stuck 
in fragility in a different way from those that are making sustained efforts to bring sta-
bility and reforms in their country. 
Governance re-engineering takes time and is not analogous to changing an engine to a 
car. A long time span and perspective are required. Engaging and working with moti-
vated clients requires experiential learning. Learning new ‘concepts of living’, living in 
truth and justice, is the key for improving governance and tackling corruption in which 
the most visible anticorruption efforts—sanctions, debarments, investigations, conjoint 
policies and other collective actions—are necessary defenses; as offenses they resemble 
an unfriendly and aggressive leader. Punishments are unlikely to ‘cure’ corruption. 
Recent studies show convincingly that governance, institutional strengthening and ca-
pacity building are important for a country’s socioeconomic development. They result 
from engaging the ‘positive constellation of forces’ (Spotnitz 1952) and marshaled 
against the ‘negative constellation of forces’ of the client. Punishment approaches 
against corruption will not foster good governance and are unlikely to sustain it. It is 
unfortunate that for many organizations of integrity, sanctions, debarments, and the like 
are their main instruments and accomplishments. The positive and negative drives can-
Antti Talvitie is Professor (em) in Aalto University, Espoo, Finland. Previously he worked in the World 
Bank, in the private sector, served as Director of Highway Construction and Maintenance in Finland, and 
as Professor and Chairman of Civil Engineering at SUNY in Buffalo. He has Ph.D. from Northwestern 
University, Evanston, IL, and Certificate in Psychoanalysis from Boston Graduate School of Psychoanal-
ysis. He has private practice as psychoanalyst and consultant in the Washington DC area. E-Mail: aptalvi-
tie@gmail.com 
Acknowledgement 
I am indebted to Dr. Binyam Reja of the World Bank for mentoring me in institutional economics. His 
contribution to this paper is considerable and he coauthored with me an earlier (2000) version of the 
paper.  The present paper was read  in the 2012 Conference of the International Public Management 
Network: Innovations in Public Management for Combating Corruption, in Honolulu. The paper 
reviewer Prof Robert Klitgaard, and Profs. Larry Jones, Laura Langbein, Fred Thompson, Jeffrey Ady 
and Tachyon Choi, and Dr. Clay Wescott gave insightful comments that benefited the paper. Profs 
Klitgaard and Jones elaborated on the existence of large within group variance. Prof Ady pointed out 
the tribal and cultural factors, while Laura Langbein and Tachyon Choi (who referred me to Peter 
Evans’ observations on predation and embedded autonomy) gave tacit support to the paper’s concepts. 
Prof Thompson suggested that the paper is really two papers: one from the neoinstitutional economics 
and another from psychoanalytic perspective. While all these comments contain truths, I believe that, 
as a broad-brush generalization and without doing violence to facts, governance is homogeneous 
within the two regions but not between, and that working in the interface of the two theories, interme-
diated by leadership, has its benefits: a fresh approach to treat corruption. 
Observed Differences in Corruption between Asia and Africa: The Industrial Organization of Corruption and Its Cure 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 13, Iss. 1, 2012 
 www.ipmr.net  131 IPMR
not be neutralized, but their negatives can be redirected for constructive work. It is 
worth repeating that the forces that help build good enough governments are the same 
that can act as agents of corruption and as safeguards against it. It is not clear what kind 
of reconciliation, amnesty or penalties, punishment or forgiveness, would be appropriate 
for past corruption; this issue must be discussed but decided in a different forum. There 
are international—even biblical—precedents. 
The consultative process for strengthening the ‘positive constellation of forces’ needs 
trained analysts and facilitators. A project supported by a multilateral bank might pro-
vide an appropriate context but with a more frequent and regular pattern of cooperation. 
To complement the group sessions, forums are required where the leaders from gov-
ernment, the private sector and the civil society do the talking rather than being talked 
to. This is not the common practice in seminars where the imported experts do the talk-
ing. It may be asked if this transformative endeavor is a project. I think not. It would 
rather be a process grounded on the contact function in which the affected interests 
gather voluntarily at a modern polis to discuss their governance issues, including cor-
ruption, their resistances to change and their defenses against turmoil and violence, 
with the same analysts to preserve historical memory (as the political leaders and other 
actors may change). 
It is emphasized in conclusion that in attending to the “cancer of corruption” as an emo-
tional malaise it is important to strengthen not only the independent and co-operative 
personal capacities in team work but also the knowledge-based capacities for changes in 
governance, the real economy and in financial management. Governance improve-
ment—sector restructuring, property rights, privatization, regulation, pricing reforms, 
and access to information and civil service—pays dividends. Reining in elite or state 
capture, empowering citizenry and changing government expenditure patterns must pro-
ceed in parallel. Technical cooperation must take the form of process consulting (Schein 
1990, reviewed in Talvitie 2008 and 2009). Effective safeguards must also be estab-
lished to protect the affected persons from violence in working for change in the ‘con-
cepts of living’. Without the ‘reformers’, changes in the dysfunctional governance and 
socioeconomic patterns cannot take place. It is not uncommon at all that ‘whistle blow-
ers’ are scapegoated or active participants for change killed (New York Times, Septem-
ber 18, 2011). Non-constructive and violent paths of discharging resistance to change 
are indeed of grave concern in confronting corruption. 
NOTES 
 
1 This definition of corruption is used in the World Bank. It leaves open the issue to 
whose ‘private gain’ the public office is abused. Transparency International defini-
tion for corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
2 Christopher (OECD 1995), Wolfensohn, Wolfowitz, and Zoellick various speeches, 
including addresses at World Bank Annual Meetings and elsewhere. 
3 See, Park (1995) on South Korea; Phongpaicht (1994) on Thailand; Mehmet (1994) 
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4 A private sector survey found that poor physical infrastructure in Asia was a greater 
obstacle to doing business than corruption, while in Africa poor infrastructure was a 
lesser obstacle to doing business than corruption (WDR 1997, p. 42). 
5 The treatment is valid to all regions and countries, but this paper is mainly focused 
on Asia and Africa. 
6 This is a broad-brush generalization we claim to be valid. Profs. Robert Klitgaard 
and Larry Jones have pointed out that there is much heterogeneity within both Asian 
and African countries. This is true. The claim for homogeneity is only with respect to 
governance dimension. An observation similar to ours regarding governance is made 
by Evans (1989, 1992). 
7 Alternatively, an openly violent leader can keep a group together by force for a peri-
od of time. However, unless libidinal ties develop, as they may, such group is unsta-
ble. Although violence is an important part of corruption, the violence-bound groups 
are largely ignored in this paper. Their study would be important as they do exist in 
many countries. Many observations in the paper apply, however, as every group uses 
sanctions and (benign) violence to maintain itself. 
8 The evidence for these conclusions is indirect, but observable. Experience in perfor-
mance-based road maintenance contracts is that sanctions are not an effective means 
of compliance with quality requirements, bonuses for good work are better. Sanc-
tions have not eliminated corruption or destructive behavior, although they do have 
effect, but they can also inspire new ways of corruption and destructive behavior, in-
cluding lying. Finally, the most tangible evidence comes from psychoanalysis where 
sanctions and punishment are not effective treatment against destructive behavior. 
9 This treatment of corruption applies to private sector corruption as well although the 
focus is on public sector corruption: corruption involving a private interest paying a 
government official for favors otherwise impossible or difficult to obtain. 
10 One way of ensuring compliance in a corruption contract is through strong-arm tech-
nique and organized crime as is believed to be the case in many countries (Skaperdas 
1992; Gambetta 1993). The extent of strong-arming in legal businesses involving 
heads of state, influential ministers or a chaebol is not known, though isolation or 
‘unexpected death’ do occur. 
11 In Asia, ‘relationship building’ is regularly used as euphemism for paying money for 
what is a corruption contract. Variations exist. An Asian businessman explained to 
the author that he “never tried to influence the outcome of a decision by a bureaucrat, 
but sometimes he has had to pay one in order to get a decision made in a bureaucra-
cy.” In the West, companies invest emotionally for relationship building even in the 
fields where price competition holds. For example, normally consulting companies 
refrain from antagonizing government officials with complaints because that might 
hurt the relationship or exclude them from future contracts. That is neither corruption 
nor hypocrisy, simply controlled behavior. 
12 Interestingly, the Alliance model of procurement approximates vertical integration: 
all parties share the gains and pains. 
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13 It also is possible that violence rather than libidinal ties (religion, tribal kinship, par-
ty, and common cultural and legal heritage) hold together some countries in Africa, 
Middle East and the Former FSU countries. By definition, relationships are difficult 
in such social environment. 
14  The World Bank report on the East Asian Miracle argues––wrongly we believe––
that one of the factors that explains the Asian growth is that the bureaucracy and 
economic technocracy were insulated from political interests. 
15 Mathematically, the ‘relationship’ builder would have to increase his truck loads to 
stay net revenue neutral. It is likely, however, that he would amortize the cost of ‘re-
lationship’ as fixed business expense and use it to increase his reputation, goodwill, 
business, and power. The trucking company might even reduce its truck loads in re-
turn for favorable regulations by government to eliminate competition. This scenario 
shows the complexity of analyzing corruption and its causes and effects. 
16 Furman and Stiglitz (1998) in an analysis of the East Asian crisis argue that neither 
macroeconomic aggregates nor the lack of ‘transparency’ (including corruption) 
were causes of the crisis. They assign the chief causes to rapid financial liberaliza-
tion, to large short-term debt exposure that “made the East-Asian countries vulnera-
ble to a sudden withdrawal of confidence” and the failure of temporary high interest 
rate policy. While these factors may have played a role, our observation of the situa-
tion in East-Asia does not accord with these authors’ arguments about transparency. 
Similarly, a large short-term debt exposure hardly causes ‘withdrawal of confidence’. 
The argument about temporary interest rates is plausible [and artificial fixed ex-
change rate (in Thailand) at that time]. But, were these policies exogenous? We be-
lieve not. These authors restricted their analysis to using economic variables without 
justifying that choice. We would also argue that the current (2008 - ) financial crisis 
that started in the US, with enron-madoff side-shows, also had other causes than sub-
prime lending. The crisis begs the question why the denial of the inevitable persisted 
as long as it did, and why did the crisis enter the consciousness, and with disastrous 
effects, at the time when it did—the US presidential elections for leadership. 
17 Citing Alchian, Cheung argues that this assertion is well accepted and that it derives 
from property rights. 
18 Public transport required a government license for the route. ‘Relationships’ mattered 
in the award or allocation of routes to the applicant firm. Within the firm, routes were 
given to crews who must pay the company a daily fee, which depended on the ex-
pected passenger demand; the crew kept the fare revenue. Crews invested in ‘rela-
tionships’ with the company’s management to get the best routes. Some arranged to 
pay the dispatchers in the terminals. Some paid the police for transgressions of traffic 
rules. The web of ‘relationships’ was endless. The government-owned bus company 
required a substantial annual subsidy, even though a dozen other companies made a 
profit under the same operating rules. Ultimately the taxpayers paid the bribe. The 
private sector bus companies freely admitted to paying for ‘relationships’ to gangs 
and the police, and for cultivating ‘relationships’ with the bureaucracy. They resisted 
the ‘new route method’ (which a local university has explored) whereby the crews 
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cause in this way all the money would be accounted for. This pattern had city-
specific variations. 
19 Indonesia had several privileged groups. Foremost was the group associated with the 
former President Suharto. The other groups were composed of politicians in the Gol-
gar party, the army, and selected public officials held together by a common univer-
sity bond. The Chinese minority is not considered a privileged group, although some 
members of that minority may enjoy privileges because of corruption. 
20 This was grave warning signal. As will be discussed in the next section, violence will 
escalate if emotional ties between people dissolve or seriously deteriorate as a result 
of disillusionment with the leader. To complicate matters, rather than destroying the 
old corrupt system, violent change often replaces it by a new corrupt system. By now 
it is known that violence was a visible part of the change, but not in the way the au-
thors anticipated at that time (1995; Reja and Talvitie 2000). 
21 In Indonesia, in the late 90s, several trade associations signaled willingness to coop-
erate and proposed approaches to reduce corruption. 
22 There is a third kind of group where group cohesion is propelled from outside: a 
common hateful object (e.g. ‘the West’ or the U.S.) is found outside the group and is 
subtly used to strengthen the group ties. The two prototype groups, one with domi-
nant positive and the other with dominant negative emotional ties held together by 
the threat of violence, suggest that different paths may need to be followed to ‘cure‘ 
corruption. A not so far-fetched hypothesis––for future research to test––is that the 
path from corrupt, force-dominated group to an uncorrupt one is via corrupt but li-
bidinally held, cohesive groups (although there religious ideals may undermine the 
cohesion). These issues are discussed from the perspective of trust in Talvitie (2012). 
To clarify the group structure Freud’s drawing of it (1923, p. 116) is shown below 







Freud defines a primary group as “a 
number of individuals [the solid horizon-
tal lines] who have put one and the same 
[external] object [e.g. president, a reli-
gious figure, military leader, an idea] in 
the place of their ego ideal and have con-
sequently identified themselves with one 
another in their ego”. [Clarifying words 
in the parentheses by the author]. 
 
23 Klitgaard (1998) proposes corruption reduction competitions between governments, 
which reward the winner by superior support from international donors, and that 
prominent officials and politicians be prosecuted for corruption. We find these meth-
ods unconvincing, even unfair. Both ignore the emotional basis of corruption and al-
so the other party, the bribe giver. Corruption reduction competitions are themselves 
corruption. It is common knowledge that when bureaucracies or political bodies 
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‘clean’ themselves, they simply root out the weakest perpetrators, punish them, and 
continue business as usual. 
24 There is much literature on State Reform from which the title is borrowed. For exam-
ple, The 1997 World Development Report: The State in a Changing World; Shepsle, 
K. A. “The Political Economy of State Reform––Political to the Core”; Comprehen-
sive Development Framework proposed by World Bank president J.D. Wolfensohn; 
Cohen et al (2002); and Talvitie (1997). 
25 Good references are Cohen et al (2002), Marshall (2006 and 2011), and Ormont 
(1995). 
26 If public administration capacity is very low, technical assistance is necessary on 
governance. Although the technical assistance should be independent of the group 
sessions, it would be a complementary training environment. 
27 In the paper by Reja and Talvitie (2000), based on Freud’s group model, both types 
of violence were predicted to happen in Indonesia (and they did). 
28 Transference is a process of the analysand’s (group member’s) unconscious transfer 
of his (early) relationships to the person of the analyst or a member of the group. 
Analysis of the transference leads to ‘cure’. 
29 In a country with no experience in competitive bidding for road works and making 
cost estimates for bids, a workshop was organized to discuss the concept of competi-
tive bidding and calculating a cost estimate from the resources needed to do the 
work. There was much discussion, heated at times, why two companies would come 
to a different result: unit costs had to be the same. This view caused no small puz-
zlement in the project team, until finally a contractor put on the table a ‘white book’ 
that had government calculated unit costs in it. The concept held was that the other 
actors, say material suppliers, would sell every contractor resources at the cost indi-
cated in the book. It took time for the contractors to deal with their suppliers to loos-
en the grip of the ‘white book’ and learn calculating unit costs from the resources 
used. It was no wonder why the bids had nearly the same cost estimates initially, 
possibly also because of collusion to divide the works. However, it would have been 
unfair to conduct an investigation and punish for collusion because the concept held 
was a carryover from the past economic regime. However, this cannot be general-
ized. Real unlawful collusion does exist also (Paterson and Chauduri, 2007). The task 
team has to make a judgment. 
Transplanting solutions from one’s native country or a textbook to a developing 
country is a common and serious problem that is normally detrimental to develop-
ment. In a country an exasperated Minister remarked to the second author that they 
already have this system from country X, organigram from country Y, and design 
standards from country Z. What he wanted to have were concepts and models that 
had a local ring to them, genuinely relevant, useful and acceptable. 
Antti Talvitie 
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APPENDIX A1 
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Other 46 Sub-Saharan countries
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2010) 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer.asp?docid=14293&intItemID=2068&lang=1
 
APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS (ALSO SEE LAPLANCE AND PONTALIS, 1973) 
Contact function --- Term and method developed by Hyman Spotnitz to work with 
analysands; it complements “free association”. Contact function simply means to follow 
and remain with the analysand’s (client’s) thinking without disturbing it or introducing 
new ideas or interpretations. 
Ego-syntonic --- Being or presenting oneself similar to the group analysands (clients). 
“To be on the same page” with the group (clients). 
Libido, libidinal --- Libido, is the life drive in Freud’s dualistic theory of the instincts. It 
has the aim to create and support life and create and maintain ever greater unities. The 
death drive has the opposing tendency, aggression, and its aim is inanimate state, death. 
Polisanalysis --- Term coined by Prof. Jonathan Lear to designate governance in ancient 
Athens where free men congregated at Polis to discuss and decide policy. Psychoanalyt-
ic groups have stable membership. In this paper polisanalysis designates transient, not 
permanent groups, normal in government and planning. 
Resistance --- In psychoanalysis ‘resistance’ means words or actions of the analysand 
that obstruct his gaining access to his unconscious. 
Transference --- A process of the analysand’s (client’s) unconscious transfer of his early 
relationships to the person of the analyst. Analysis of the transference leads to “cure”. 
For extended discussion see LaPlance and Pontalis (1973). 
Counter-transference --- The analyst’s response (feelings) to the analysand’s transfer-
ence (feelings). 
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